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I. Introduction
Public health agencies undertake a broad range of
health promotion and injury and disease prevention
activities in collaboration with an array of actors, such
as the community, businesses, and non-proﬁt organizations. These activities are “multisectoral” in nature
and centered on public health agencies that oversee
and engage with the other actors.1 Public health agencies can inﬂuence the hazardous activities in the private
sector in a variety of ways, “ranging from prohibition
and regulation to volunteerism, and from cooperation to cooption.”2 Hence, a public health agency that
possesses the necessary administrative resources and
authority is vital to the effective implementation of
health policies and regulations.3
In the developing world, however, many state health
agencies lack these basic capacities in dealing with
critical health threats, including their ability to avert
epidemics of communicable diseases arising from
poor sanitary conditions. A serious constraint is the
shortage of public health funding for health agencies
in the developing world for typical agency functions
(e.g., surveillance, monitoring, assessment, and intervention). This is often aggravated by the transactionintensive demands entailed in enforcing regulations
among an array of private and public sector actors
including individuals, businesses, and local bodies
responsible for providing civic services. This combination of constraints makes it difficult for agencies to use
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ling public health needs such as assuring sanitation,
nuisance abatement, occupational health and safety,
and infectious disease control.
Another problem arises from the fact that public
health agencies can be quite dependent on the judicial
system to enforce compliance with health violations
through the threat of civil litigation or criminal conviction. Litigation is an expensive process — even in the
developed world. The U.S. faces caseloads that often
dissuade prosecutors from pursuing all but the most
serious crimes. In such an atmosphere, public health
offenses are seen as small, and food and drug ﬁrms
are wealthy and willing to expend resources to defend
themselves.4 The expense of litigation can be onerous
for developing country public health budgets.
The problem is further compounded by the slow
and erratic judicial systems of some developing countries. These legal systems, in effect, do not constitute
a credible threat for individuals and businesses that
create health hazards and violate public health norms.
In Nigeria, for example, there is a limited number of
government officials with legal training and they are
overburdened by non-health related cases (ranging
from large-scale corruption to political vote-rigging
scandals to murders by public vigilantes).5 Hence,
public health violations are generally given a lower
priority by government prosecutors. In addition, the
tendency of the government to delay the payment of
salaries to judicial officials leaves them vulnerable to
corporate bribery.6
There are clearly many reasons to look beyond conventional litigation, and consider other approaches to
regulation, which can offer insights into how developing
countries with limited resources, limited administrative capacity, and slow judicial systems can implement
public health regulations and standards. This article
explores several modiﬁed and alternative implementation mechanisms being utilized in the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
countries. Section II reviews the traditional regulatory
powers possessed by public health agencies in OECD
countries in the governance of persons and businesses.
Section III discusses traditional approaches to regulatory implementation. Section IV discusses lower-cost
strategies for implementing regulatory powers. Sections V and VI explores alternative methods of achieving public health compliance outside of the courtroom,
including conﬂict resolution and public-private cooperation, followed by the conclusions.

II. Public Health Regulation of Persons
and Businesses
Public health agencies typically possess an array of
regulatory powers needed to implement health and
global health governancefall 2010

safety standards within society. The regulatory mechanisms apply both to persons and businesses.
Regulation of Persons
In OECD countries, public health officials traditionally have held a variety of powers to control personal
behavior for the prevention of communicable disease
transmission. These regulatory measures include
screening, reporting, treatment, vaccination, isolation, and quarantine.
Different countries vary in how far the law goes in
mandating these measures. In some nations, measures
such as screening and vaccination are completely voluntary; in other nations, these measures can be compulsory. Still other nations seek to ﬁnd a middle ground
between these two extremes. The Canadian government, for example, encourages vaccination by making
public services conditional upon it; in Canada (as in
many OECD countries), parents must present proof of
their child’s vaccination in order to register their child
for public school.7 Such a method impels compliance
with public health norms without infringing on civil
liberties. Vaccinations, as a regulatory mechanism, are
considered one of the most cost-effective and widely
used public health interventions against infectious
diseases.
Screening and reporting are useful methods to
identify disease within a population and enable subsequent control measures for the protection of the public’s health.8 The use of this mechanism can range from
compulsory to fully voluntary (upon request), with
intermediate gradations. For example, OECD countries typically mandate screening of schoolchildren or
health workers for speciﬁc diseases (e.g., tuberculosis)
as a condition of school or work.
Another common regulatory mechanism in the
OECD countries is the mandatory treatment of persons diagnosed with an infectious disease. Public
health statutes may authorize public health officials to
require treatment of individuals “if they pose a signiﬁcant risk of transmission and the treatment is beneﬁcial.”9 If a public health agency seeks to compel treatment adherence, it will often go through a process of
escalating control measures whereby the use of more
stringent measures must be justiﬁed based on public
health need.
Two other common public health mechanisms
are isolation and quarantine, which both involve the
detention of persons but for different reasons. Isolation detains people who are known to have a communicable disease whereas quarantine detains asymptomatic people who are suspected to have a disease
due to exposure. During the SARS and Inﬂuenza (A)
H1N1 outbreaks, for example, countries used quaran509
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tines in a variety of settings (e.g., home, work, hospital) with different levels of coercion or enforcement.
Regulation of Business
Public health officials in the OECD countries also
possess the ability to regulate businesses, including
occupational health and safety, emission standards,
hygiene, and sanitation. Such powers are critical to
ensure that businesses behave in a safe and competent
manner and do not create undue health risks. Regulatory powers include: licensing of trades, professions,
and institutions; inspecting for violations of health
and safety standards; and abating public nuisances.
Licenses are used to allow a business (or a profession) to engage in an activity that would otherwise be
barred by law, and it typically requires the demonstration of proﬁciency in that activity. Public health agencies often utilize this mechanism to protect the public’s
health or safety through the requirement that certain
standards are met in the performance of an activity.
For example, OECD countries often issue licenses to
qualiﬁed individuals in the practice of professions
(e.g., doctors) as well as businesses in the operation of
establishments (e.g., restaurants).10
Inspections are another useful mechanism that
can be used to monitor and enforce compliance with
health and safety standards in businesses. An inspection is an official investigation or oversight — a formal and careful examination of a product, business, or
premises to ascertain its authenticity, quality, or condition. This mechanism is often utilized in the OECD
countries to determine whether conditions exist that
are deleterious to health and safety and thereby violate public health standards or rules.
In many jurisdictions — particularly those that
derive from the common law legal system — public
health officials can use the law of public nuisance to
address potential health threats and poor safety standards. The deﬁnition of public nuisance tends to be
quite broad; for example, under U.S. law, it includes
anything injurious to health. Nuisances can range
from “matters of signiﬁcant annoyance to conditions
that impose signiﬁcant risks to health and safety,”
which include scenarios where businesses (or even
private individuals) create pollution, contamination,
or infestation.11
This article focuses primarily on approaches to the
regulation of businesses.

III. Traditional Methods of Regulation
Traditional methods of implementing public health
regulations include mechanisms for monitoring,
inducing compliance, and “punishing” non-compliance. The most common methods are through
510

searches, inspection, and licensing. These forms of
“traditional regulation” have a long-established history in the OECD countries.12
Administrative Searches and Inspections
Administrative inspections can be used to enforce
public health standards. For a minor violation, the
health agency might respond with a formal notice of
health violation, but for more serious violations, the
agency might go so far as to close the business. Many
countries impose minimum inspection requirements
on licensed individuals and companies. In Ireland,
public health law mandates health and environmental
inspections at least once per year. Regular inspections
are costly, but save health resources in the long term
by maintaining high public health standards and preventing hazardous practices.13
There are a few types of administrative inspection
that public health agencies can perform. The simplest
“walk-through” inspection provides a quick assessment of a facility, in which the public health inspector
can observe operational practices, make sure that basic
public health standards are being met, and check that
records are being kept.14 Walk-through inspections
can be a simple way of maintaining compliance with
health laws because the inspection makes the presence of the public health authority felt by the company, which tends to induce compliance. A detailed
compliance assessment is a more thorough inspection
of records, interviews with staff, and examination of
self-monitoring practices. In cases of non-compliance,
the agency would collect evidence of public health violations, which could later be used as evidence in litigation.15 A ﬁnal type of inspection is a sampling inspection, which can be expensive and time-consuming, as
many forms of sampling require more tools, scientiﬁc
expertise, and resources. These could be difficult for
many local public health agencies in some developing countries. Other forms of sampling can be fairly
simple, such as testing salt for iodine content.
There are two main difficulties with inspections.
First, government inspections call into question the
fundamental civil liberties of some cultures. In the
U.S., citizens enjoy a constitutional right to be protected from “unreasonable search and seizure,” which
is meant to ensure that citizens have the right to be
secure in their own property. This constitutional right
creates certain boundaries that government inspections may not infringe upon. Nevertheless, inspections span the entire ﬁeld of public health-related
law, ensuring the safe construction and maintenance
of buildings or residences, purity of food and drugs,
sanitary condition of farms or restaurants, safe workplace environments, and control of pesticides and
journal of law, medicine & ethics
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toxic emissions. The U.K. deals with individual rights
by placing ﬁrm limits on the government’s right to
inspection. Inspections are often limited to “reasonable hours” or “with notice,” or to particular hours of
the day. Inspection powers, however, are still signiﬁcant because they allow for entry without a warrant
when inspections are conducted for the purposes of
public health protection.16
The second difficulty is that inspections can be an
expensive form of regulation. Inspections take signiﬁcant time, require trained workers, and can be
subject to graft. All three problems risk being exacerbated in developing countries where resources are at
a premium.

some enforcement tool.”19 This is of particular concern
where agencies are chronically short of funds (and/or
licensing procedures are unnecessarily cumbersome
and transaction-intensive) because proper monitoring can easily be pushed aside in favor of expediency
and graft. In creating a licensing system, governments
must be careful not to set unrealistic administrative
demands on local agencies. Without adequate funding and oversight, a licensing system can be ineffective
and even lead to abuse.
Another problem is that, in some developing countries, underpaid government officials can be tempted
to use licenses as a tool for extortion.20 Most OECD
countries have built, over many years, a series of internal checks on government authority
(such as a public complaint process,
public ombudsmen, administrative
In creating a licensing system, governments must
review, and judicial oversight) to
be careful not to set unrealistic administrative
address such problems. Citizens who
feel that they have been harassed
demands on local agencies. Without adequate
by government authorities have
funding and oversight, a licensing system can be
recourse through a variety of strucineffective and even lead to abuse.
tures. In countries that dedicate fewer
resources to checking government
authority, concerns about harassment can be substantial, and careful
Licenses
measures need to be put in place to enhance transparLicensing can be a highly effective approach to regency and accountability in the regulatory process.
ulating potentially unsafe behavior. This approach
serves a two-fold purpose in public health regulation.
IV. Overcoming the Limits of
First, a licensing system — by requiring proof of comTraditional Regulation
petence and compliance with minimum standards
The administration and enforcement of public health
— can sift out the unqualiﬁed business and unsafe
regulations are highly resource intensive tasks that
practices. Second, through inspections and sanctions
can be difficult for developing countries due to limfor violators, licensing offers continuous public health
ited agency capacities, poorly designed procedures
monitoring and supervision. In the OECD counfor regulatory implementation, and unreliable juditries, licensure generally allows ﬂexible enforcement
cial systems. Although traditional mechanisms such
by public health officials. For example, in Australia,
as licensing and inspections are vital to public health,
health officers who detect poor hygiene by a food venmany OECD agencies have started to supplement
dor have several options: prosecution, a default notice,
these methods with less cumbersome and expensive
or a “clean up” order. In some states within Australia,
approaches in recent years. In particular, agencies have
such as New South Wales, failure to comply with the
adopted the use of formal notice, public disclosure,
ﬁrst order may lead to a second order that would proand cascading sanctions to lower costs and improve
hibit the sale, handling, or manufacture of food on the
compliance. Such approaches to reducing the costs of
premises.17 Similarly, in the U.S., the Food and Drug
regulatory implementation might be useful for develAdministration (FDA) can issue a license suspension
oping countries to adapt to their own circumstances.
that is “effective immediately, with a right of hearing
only upon the ﬁrm’s request for reinstatement under
Formal Notice
a new permit.”18 These strategies allow agencies to
Written notices of health violations offer a highly
respond ﬂexibly to health threats.
cost-effective way to enforce health regulations. These
Though the licensing system provides many bennotices are usually simple; their job, in the words of one
efits, there may be drawbacks for the developing
U.S. FDA manager, is to tell the company to “knock it
world. Despite licensure’s ﬂexibility and effectiveness,
off!” More formally, the FDA describes a warning letter
it can be an “administratively expensive and cumberas “a legally signiﬁcant notice...by the FDA, that a per-
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son is believed to be in violation of laws or regulations
enforced by the FDA.”21 Since warning letters do not
carry any force of law, they do not require any official
collection of data by the health agency. If the company
in question feels that it has done nothing wrong, they
can dialogue with the agency in an attempt to resolve
the problem. But the warning letter serves as notice
that the agency believes there is a violation and that if
the company does not change its behavior, legal action

“surprisingly effective” in achieving regulatory goals
without coercion.23 Public disclosure can take the form
of product labeling, health warnings, conﬂict of interest statements, health outcomes data, adverse event
reporting, and product safety information.
There are many potential uses of public disclosure.
The threat of public disclosure can compel companies
to change product design, since the threat of disclosing
harmful ingredients often makes companies nervous

Licenses and inspections are more effective enforcement mechanisms,
but also more expensive to administer. Written notices and public disclosure
are less costly to use, but they are impotent without a credible threat of real
sanctions. Thus, the most effective way to use these approaches is
in combination as a “cascading hierarchy of sanctions.”
could follow. Warning letters also serve the alternative
purpose of establishing evidence for any future trials
that a person’s or company’s actions were taken “in
deﬁance of well-understood proscriptions.”22
The FDA has found that written notices can be
a particularly effective way to induce compliance
with health regulations and standards, especially
when used in conjunction with public disclosure (see
below). For example, the FDA can issue a warning letter to an offending company that is suspected of selling a misbranded drug. As a next step, the FDA can
threaten legal action or public disclosure in exchange
for the company’s agreement to remedy the problem.
A recent example of the simplicity of the FDA’s use of
this strategy occurred in 2006 when the FDA began
requiring food companies to list trans fat content separately on the Nutrition Facts panel of all packaged
foods. Though the FDA does not regulate trans fat
in foods, the simple act of informing companies that
their products would be displayed as containing trans
fat content was enough to induce change in a number of companies. These companies reduced the trans
fat content in their products to below the minimum
amount per serving so that they could they could label
their products “trans fat free” on the packaging.
Public Disclosure
Public disclosure is an efficient and straightforward
way of enforcing compliance with public health regulations. Public health agencies can require companies
to give them information on certain activities (such as
pollution levels) and then release that information to
the public. The resulting public pressure on the company (or even the threat of public pressure) has been
512

enough to improve their product. Or public disclosure
can be used to encourage honest dealings. In the U.S.,
the FDA requires drug companies to disclose all ﬁnancial transactions made between the company and any
clinical investigators. Public disclosure can caution
consumers about the hazards of products and educate
consumers about safe uses of those products. It can
encourage safer professional practices by helping the
public to monitor health behavior; public disclosure
of the performance of physicians, hospitals, and managed health-care plans provide a good example of this
tool. Public disclosure can even be used as a lower-cost
(though less effective) way of conducting an inspection, since asking for the information in itself may
induce the sort of improvements that inspections are
meant to compel.
Public disclosure can be a powerful way of increasing
administrative authority at low cost, and without imposing on civil liberties. The public health agency need not
coerce nor waste valuable resources; it simply brings
information out into the light of public scrutiny where
public opinion can pressure companies into reforming
their behavior. Unlike some forms of regulation, there is
little political backlash from public disclosure. In most
OECD countries, consumers and patients are thought
to have an undisputed right to be fully informed in
making their public health decisions. Public disclosure
does not compel companies to alter products or design;
it merely increases transparency to potential consumers. Finally, the low costs of public disclosure make it a
useful mechanism for developing countries facing limited agency capacity. Because it does not increase monitoring costs, public disclosure is a low-cost approach to
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public health regulation that can be implemented by
developing country governments.
A Cascading Hierarchy of Sanctions
All of these implementation strategies have their
strengths and weaknesses. Licenses and inspections
are more effective enforcement mechanisms, but also
more expensive to administer. Written notices and public disclosure are less costly to use, but they are impotent without a credible threat of real sanctions. Thus,
the most effective way to use these approaches is in
combination as a “cascading hierarchy of sanctions.”
In a cascading hierarchy of sanctions, the public
health agency addresses a public health problem in
a series of steps, to induce compliance with minimal
resort to the more extreme measures. The ﬁrst step
usually takes the form of a voluntary measure. In the
case of a food vendor practicing improper hygiene, the
ﬁrst step would be simply to explain to the vendor how
to improve food hygiene. If the matter is not resolved
within a speciﬁc period, the agency moves on to the
next step, issuing a formal notice, asking the vendor
to remedy the situation. Such a notice would state the
speciﬁcs of the violation and make it clear that if the
vendor does not remedy their practices, more severe
action will follow. If again, the matter is not resolved,
the agency responds by imposing a ﬁne and sending a
second notice demanding that the agent remedy the
situation. If the vendor still fails to rectify the problem, then the agency should make the issue public by
forcing the restaurant to publicly disclose its sanitation practices and any risks to the public’s health.
Finally, only as a last resort, would the agency take the
administratively expensive steps of formal inspection,
withdrawing the vendor’s license, or prosecuting the
vendor.
At any of these stages, the vendor can appeal against
perceived harassment by taking his complaints to
an ombudsman or mediator. The judiciary becomes
involved only if the vendor decides to appeal to the
court as a last resort. But, even here, the vendor is
deterred from this. In the course of dealing with the
vendor, the public health agency has accumulated a
large amount of formal evidence. This evidence will
make successful prosecution of the case a much simpler matter and the vendor will likely be deterred from
attempting to litigate the issue since he is unlikely to
win. This strategy not only minimizes the number
of resources that must be immediately committed
to combat a standard public health violation; it also
minimizes the chances that the case will come before
a court. The administrative agency is able to take a
number of escalating steps — none of them very costly
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— that can address the restaurant’s behavior at a minimal cost to both parties.
Of course, these simpler measures work better if
backed by a credible threat of sanctions in the case of
repeated noncompliance. Unfortunately, the ultimate
threat is often that of judicial action, which can lack
credibility if the process is slow and unpredictable.
The next section discusses some alternate approaches
to judicial action.

V. Efficient Conﬂict Resolution
Overcrowded and inefficient courts are not a problem unique to the developing world. In many OECD
countries, legal dockets are over-crowded, with long
case backlogs and underfunded government prosecutors. As a result, public health agencies have begun to
employ non-judicial techniques to resolve disputes
arising in public health administration. These techniques usually involve less costly and time-consuming
processes than do court cases.
Alternative Dispute Resolution
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is an approach
that attempts to settle disputes outside of the government judicial system. It relies on methods such
as negotiation, mediation, or arbitration to resolve
disputes between parties. Arbitration and mediation
accomplish many of the same objectives as a standard court trial, but provide some added beneﬁts in
increased efficiency. Arbitration is similar to a standard legal trial; however, instead of the case being
heard by a judge and conducted according to the formal rules of the legal system, the dispute is argued
in a less formal setting and decided by a mutually
acceptable arbiter (often an expert in the ﬁeld). Such
disputes are typically resolved more quickly and with
less expense than a standard court trial. And since
both sides have explicitly agreed to be bound by the
arbiter’s decision, there is generally less dissatisfaction
with the outcome.
Like arbitration, mediation is a more cost- and
time-effective means to settling a dispute. In mediation, the parties to a given dispute gather and negotiate (with the help of a mediator) a mutually acceptable resolution to the dispute. Mediation provides the
added beneﬁt of encouraging compromise and mutual
understanding among parties, a fact which often leads
to better relations and fewer recurrences of conﬂict.
A recent dispute in Germany is representative of
alternative dispute resolution’s growing role in OECD
health and environmental conﬂicts. In the tiny village
of Münchehagen in Lower Saxony, local citizens and
the district public health agency became concerned
about a hazardous waste landﬁll. It was suspected
513
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that local industry (aided by a lax municipal authority) was responsible for illegal dumping in the landﬁll,
which led to the contamination of the village’s soil and
water and was posing a danger to public health.24 Conﬂict over the landﬁll arose between the local citizens
and the district public health agency on one side and
local industry on the other side, but the parties agreed
to resolve their dispute through mediation. A public
health official trained in mediation was brought in
from a neighboring province to help resolve the dispute, and this led to mediation negotiations involving
representatives from local authorities, environmental organizations, state government, and concerned
members of the public. The procedure was ﬁnanced
by the health and environmental agency which agreed
to keep the public regularly informed about the negotiations. These negotiations are felt to be a strong success story on the power of mediation as numerous
agreements have been reached on questions of technology and the extent of the clean-up and the committees have continued to meet afterwards to monitor implementation and discuss future issues. Perhaps
most importantly, mediation has been a much cheaper
option than a standard court trial, saving the parties
vast sums of time and attorney fees.25
Austria has been a pioneer in encouraging mediation
in public health and environmental conﬂicts. In some
cases, local public authorities may suspend general
administrative procedures in order to conduct mediation. According to a study by the Austrian Society for
Environment and Technology, the beneﬁts of these
mediation proceedings were impressive. Most mediation proceedings were concluded within one year. For
larger projects, the costs of mediation were estimated
at .01% of the total project cost; for small projects,
the costs were between 1-10% percent. The mediation
costs were borne either by the party responsible for
the project, or jointly by government bodies.26
Such success stories have led to the growing use of
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in OECD
public health agencies. Alternative dispute resolution
is perhaps the fastest growing trend in administrative
law today.27 In New South Wales, Australia, the Health
Commission provides mediation programs that divert
disputes away from the litigation system.28 In France,
government and scholars both promote alternative dispute resolution as a means of “relieving the burden of
the courts, and resolving disputes in a faster, simpler,
and cheaper manner.”29 In administrative disputes in
particular, mediation has become an increasingly frequent approach to resolving conﬂicts between administrators and businesses or persons. Even in Germany,
where “virtually all major (environmental and health)
disputes until recently ended up in court,” the trend
514

towards alternative dispute resolution has increased,
as both companies and local NGOs have realized the
economic and social beneﬁts.30
Alternative dispute resolution is not by any means
a strictly Western construct. In fact, alternative dispute resolution is experiencing rapid growth in Asia,
where many countries have been quick to realize the
gains in legal efficiency and effectiveness that alternative dispute resolution can bring.31 The China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission
has administered more international arbitration cases
than any other institution in the world over the past
few years. But international alternative dispute resolution’s growth in China has organic roots, as China
has enacted sweeping reforms and updates to its alternative dispute resolution system, allowing it to play a
larger role in domestic law. Under the new reforms,
“domestic arbitration is to be handled by commissions
established at the municipal level which are independent of and not subordinate to any government
or administrative body.”32 In this new system, each
local arbitration commission is a member of the newly
formed China Arbitration Association, an independent organization that supervises its own arbitrators
and provides a set of model procedural rules.33
Like many non-traditional approaches to regulation,
alternative dispute resolution has signiﬁcant potential
in developing countries. Alternative dispute resolution is much cheaper than adjudication through the
traditional legal system where long, expensive trials
can cause both sides of the dispute to end up worse-off
than before. Furthermore, alternative dispute resolution provides a better opportunity for both parties to
walk away on cordial and mutually beneﬁcial terms
than the adversarial court system (where it is rare that
a court ruling will satisfy all parties to the conﬂict).
It may also dovetail with local practices: for example, historically, in common law countries, a panel of
industry experts familiar with standard practices and
dealings often helped settle business disputes.34
Ombudsmen
Many OECD countries have agency Ombudsmen
whose job is to act as a trusted intermediary between
the people and government agencies. These Ombudsmen serve a watchdog role to identify government
abuses and act in a “mediator-like” capacity to negotiate differences. Ombudsmen cannot be removed from
office, a fact that enables them to represent the people
in disputes with government, while insulating them
from political pressures.
The U.K.’s Health Service Ombudsman is typical of
the kind of intermediary that OECD nations employ
to guard against agency abuses. In recent years, the
journal of law, medicine & ethics
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U.K. Health Service Ombudsman has brought cases
against government missteps on diverse issues such
as environmental violations, and the discriminatory
distribution of health services. Many of these cases
have resulted in improved health administration. For
example, in 2003, the Health Service Ombudsman
brought a case against the government for denying
health services to certain disabled and elderly citizens after receiving numerous complaints. The government eventually agreed to pay out a large sum in
restitution and promised to review its actions and
take greater precautions to avoid repeating the same
mistake.35
Most OECD countries have an Ombudsman or
mediator capable of confronting the government over
perceived abuses. These Ombudsmen play an impor-

VI. Public-Private Cooperation
Industries operate to maximize proﬁts, and this goal
can conflict with public health objectives. Hence,
the control of businesses is a critical issue for public
health agencies. This, unfortunately, seems like an
impossible task for health agencies faced with limited
administrative capacity and the inability to prosecute
these companies in court. An alternative solution
that has surfaced in recent years is the use of publicprivate cooperation. In this case, health agencies try
to collaborate with the private sector in drafting and
implementing public health policies (or objectives)
together. This method, although imperfect, provides
a practical means through which public health agencies can achieve their objectives in resource poor
governments.

An alternative solution that has surfaced in recent years is the use of
public-private cooperation. In this case, health agencies try to collaborate with
the private sector in drafting and implementing public health policies
(or objectives) together. This method, although imperfect, provides
a practical means through which public health agencies can achieve
their objectives in resource poor governments.
tant role in making sure that citizens’ public health
complaints are heard. In Ireland, for example, 14%
of complaints related to public health.36 Some OECD
countries, such as Norway, have specialized “Health
Ombudsmen” whose job is to watch over public health
abuses. To prevent the Ombudsman from being overburdened, each of Norway’s regional governments
has its own Ombudsmen to watch over public health
and social affairs in that region. These Ombudsmen
can take a case either at their own initiative or at the
request of an interested party.37
Ombudsmen could have an important role in developing countries. Where judicial processes are slow and
erratic, public health administration is difficult, but so
is recourse against administrative abuses.38 If courts
cannot prosecute quickly or efficiently, the common
citizen has even less of a chance of efficient resolution.
Mistaken or oppressive government actions escape
scrutiny and civil liberties can be lost.39 It is therefore
important that developing countries, like developed
ones, have a strong, independent Ombudsmen or
mediators to protect these civil liberties watch against
government neglect or abuse.
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Negotiated Rulemaking
Negotiated rulemaking is “a voluntary process to
promote interactive participation in drafting regulations.”40 Sometimes known as regulatory negotiation
or “reg-neg,” negotiated rulemaking has been effective
in settings where government faces limitation in regulating public health violations. By changing the traditional roles from that of regulator and regulatee to
a more complex relationship, in which the interested
parties negotiate collectively the text of a proposed
rule, this approach can be less adversarial than traditional regulation.41 The negotiators make trade-offs,
evaluate priorities, and come to understand the position of the other parties.42
For example, in the Netherlands, the Rotterdam city
government contracts with companies upriver to stop
polluting the Rhine River. Since the city is situated in
an “end-of-pipe” position at the estuary of the Rhine
River where toxic material is dumped in the river by
upstream industries, the Rotterdam government has
negotiated environmental “covenants” with the Dutch,
German, and French upriver polluters to stem pollution. According to these contracts, the government
agrees to a certain attitude toward the environmental conduct of the other private party (e.g., to refrain
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from imposing further regulations upon the company)
while the private party agrees to limit or refrain from
polluting. The government acts as a private party
under these contracts and waives the right to sue the
company over damages caused by pollution into the
public harbor. Essentially, the government assumes a
role that is akin to that of a manager of the harbor and
negotiates a fair agreement with polluters.43
The upshot of such an agreement is that the government spends fewer resources policing the industry. Ideally, negotiated rulemaking will transform the
relationship between government and industry from
one of mutual suspicion and hostility to one of greater
cooperation. When companies or persons are given a
seat at the negotiating table, there is an opportunity to
reach a mutually agreeable arrangement and, hence,
these actors are more likely to comply with the ensuing agreement. Through this process, the government
learns to better understand industry’s concerns and
is able to design a health policy that lessens harmful practices while trying to accommodate industry
needs. The beneﬁts of negotiated rulemaking include:
reduced time and resources in required for the development of rules, faster implementation of those rules,
greater compliance, less litigation, and more cooperative relationships.44 In addition, in locations where
human and ﬁnancial regulatory resources are limited,
there may be practical beneﬁts in the cooption of private expertise.
Critics of regulatory negotiations assert that negotiated rulemaking may lead the agency to “abandon its
role as the guardian of the public interest by yielding
to the interests of powerful stakeholders.”45 This is a
valid concern as there are situations where traditional
forms of government regulation, free from private sector inﬂuence, are necessary. Public health agencies
must strive to establish and implement regulations
that protect the public’s health as its foremost concern. Nevertheless, there is a strong argument for use
of regulatory negotiations in the developing world in
some situations for the sake of health progress at the
cost of minimal trade-offs rather than an absolutely
intractable state.
Self-Regulation
Self-regulation is another technique that public health
agencies can use to encourage and improve compliance without signiﬁcant expenditures. This approach
is intended, in principle, to be a voluntary means of
achieving cooperative action without direct state
intervention; although, in practice, external intervention is often involved.46 In the OECD countries, selfregulation has been applied for public health purposes
in a variety of areas ranging from advertising to worker
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and product safety, environmental management, and
ﬁre prevention. These forms of self-regulation are useful, to some extent, in improving public health.
There are three primary approaches to self-regulation: voluntary self-regulation, whereby standards
formulation and enforcement are conducted privately;
mandated full self-regulation, whereby regulation is
privatized, but the government monitors and, in some
cases, intervenes in enforcement to ensure compliance; and mandated partial self-regulation, whereby
the government either enforces compliance with private standards or mandates the private enforcement of
public rules.47 The use of the self-regulatory approach
can take the forms of codes of conduct, industry standards, accreditation, and ratings,48 and public officials
need to work in concert with self-regulating agencies
to draft these.
Codes of conduct set out speciﬁc standards of conduct for an industry which dictate what is acceptable
and required behavior.49 For example, Medicines Australia is a self-regulatory industry association that
sets the standards for the ethical marketing of pharmaceutical products in Australia.50 Effective codes
of conduct improve compliance with regulation and
increase consumer protection at a minimal cost to the
government. Companies receive several beneﬁts from
complying with such codes: greater transparency
among the industry; improved investor conﬁdence
in the business; a competitive marketing advantage;
and a greater sense of ownership of the code leading
to a stronger commitment.51 Such codes of conduct
may not be as stringent as direct government regulation, but they are a vast improvement on the non-existent government regulation that sometimes exists in
developing countries. As such, codes of conduct have
become increasingly common in many nations. By
protecting against false claims and improper relationships between drug companies and health care professionals, these codes preempt marketing practices that
might harm public health.
Another form of quality control is mandated by the
government, but carried out by the regulated party
or another private entity. An example of this model is
employed in Germany, where blood banks are required
to test donated blood for diseases that can be transmitted by transfusion. If a unit of blood is unsafe, it cannot be distributed and the donor must be notiﬁed.52
Another method of self-regulation is for industry to create minimum standards in product design
that companies must comply with in order to receive
accreditation. Accreditation is similar to licensing, but
instead of the government monitoring and issuing
licenses, a private organization (such as an industry
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association) issues credentials to companies that meet
a speciﬁed set of design or safety standards.53
Through measures such as licensing or accreditation, self-regulation associations can exert a large
impact on industry compliance with public health
objectives; specifically, standards of competence,
safety, or design. In addition, the negative publicity
of losing such accreditation provides a major incentive for these companies to conform to industry standards. Government sanctions, in some instances, can
give self-regulation the force of law. For example, if a
hospital wishes to participate in a U.S. government
health-care program, it must be accredited by the
Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Hospitals,
a self-regulatory body.54 Self-regulation also provides
many of the same advantages of negotiated rulemaking. Well-constructed industry self-regulation can
provide for speedy implementation, greater ﬂexibility, less burden on government, and reduced political
opposition.55
Examples of industry self-regulation in OECD countries are abundant. For example, in the U.S., associations representing the alcohol industry require advertising to reach an audience composed of more than
50 percent adults.56 As children’s health issues have
come to dominate public health discourse in recent
years, the American Beverage Association issued
guidelines to remove the sale of full-calorie soft drinks
in schools,57 while ﬁve large snack food manufacturers agreed to an initiative to discourage schools from
stocking vending machines with unhealthy foods.58 In
Canada, a self-regulating organization — Advertising Standards Canada (ASC) — compels responsible
advertising from food and beverage companies.59
Private companies can, in certain situations, be
effective regulators. Wealthy companies and institutions have more resources with which to monitor and
regulate other industry members. What is more, it is
in their economic and competitive interest to do so.
If a particular company proﬁts by breaking the rules,
then those compliant companies who are abiding by
the rules are not only well-situated to discover this foul
play, and these companies have every reason to band
together to put a halt to this undesirable practice.
Finally, ratings, like accreditation, can be used by
public health agencies to pressure companies into
conforming to public health and safety standards.
Privately run independent organizations, such as the
U.S.’s Consumer Reports, publish unbiased ratings
and reports on everything from automobile safety to
drug safety, create ratings to encourage companies to
produce safer products for consumers and, in consequence, protect the public’s health.60
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Self-regulation has many advantages, especially in
terms offering a lower-cost alternative to traditional
forms of regulation. However, there are many ﬂaws
in this policy. Self-inspection is a shaky solution even
in OECD countries with a long tradition of self-regulation. In some developing countries, a system of
self-inspections risks turning self-regulation into no
regulation without some government oversight. Selfregulation is not meant to entirely remove the threat
of monitoring or inspections, because some monitoring is still needed. The government should retain
this power. But by encouraging strong self-regulating
agencies, the government can lessen its regulatory
burden by delegating some of this work to an independent institution.
Public-Private Cooperation in Designing and
Implementing Public Health Laws
The inclusion of a wide array of participants in the
public health law development process is pivotal. Participants such as the community, civil society organizations, and private businesses can provide valuable,
and perhaps unforeseen, advice and input. It is also
important to include other sectors (such as the agencies for environment, safety, emergency relief, etc.) in
order to achieve synergistic policies that will help to
beneﬁt public health and other areas for the common
good. By allowing local groups to provide a hand in
the negotiation and establishment of new health standards, public health agencies can both improve compliance and help to soften the wave of often tumultuous
changes that globalization carries to these societies.
Transparency is another key factor to the effective implementation of public health laws. The use of
public announcements, open forums (e.g., town halls
and community gatherings), and public comment sessions (e.g., requests for information) are mechanisms
that can help dispel potential concerns of suspicion or
mystiﬁcation that might surround the development of
public health laws. Transparency will foster trust, conﬁdence, and appreciation in the efforts of public health
agencies, which will be crucial for public and private
cooperation during the implementation phase.

VII. Conclusions
There are a number of ways to reduce the costs of
assuring compliance with public health standards.
This article sought to shed light on various OECD
approaches to this problem through a review of traditional and innovative legal mechanisms, which help
implement public health regulations at lower cost,
with greater transparency, and reduce dependence on
the judiciary. The suggestions here are not intended
to provide a one-size-ﬁts-all solution to public health
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regulation in the developing world. Developing
countries build from their own unique institutional
foundations; they operate in the context of differing
political atmospheres; and they face their own sets of
problems. The mechanisms suggested here, such as
mediation or negotiated rule-making, might be particularly well-suited for some purposes where they can
tap into strong traditions of community rule-making,
while the mainstream incentive-based forms of regulation might be more applicable for most other purposes. Essentially, these approaches will have to be
adapted as needed to suit the particular health needs,
institutional contexts, and resource availabilities of
low-income countries.
Note
The views in this paper are those of the authors, and should not be
attributed to the World Bank or affiliated organizations or member
states.
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